Tuesday 29 October 2013

Alberta Court Upholds Land Titles System


    Homestead Record, Alberta Archives

In Alberta, all interests in land are recorded in a Torrens registration system, often referred to as a "Land Titles" system.  A title search produces a certificate listing all registered interests in the parcel of land searched.  Anyone interested in acquiring the land can rely on the certificate as a complete list showing who owns the property and any mortgages, liens, or other interests effecting title.  Unregistered interests are not protected.  The only exception is in cases of fraud.
 
This system can sometimes lead to harsh results, as is illustrated in a recent case in the Albert Court of Queen's Bench.  A builder constructed a "show home" on a lot in a development, relying on a contract that said the developer had to transfer title in the lot to the builder once construction of the show home began.  All of the lots in the development were subject to a mortgage in favour of the Bank of Montreal.  The developer went into receivership without transferring title to the builder, although the builder had nearly completed the home.  The receiver sold the property, and it was agreed that the value of the home (as opposed to the lot itself) was in excess of $140,000.  This amount was placed in a trust account until entitlement to the proceeds could be determined in court.
 
The court concluded that the Bank's registered mortgage had priority over the unregistered equitable interest claimed by the builder based on unjust enrichment: Bank of Montreal v. 1323606 Alberta Ltd., 2013 ABQB 596.
 
The builder, Coco Homes Ltd., claimed an equitable interest in the proceeds, arguing that if the money went to the Bank it would be acquiring the benefit of the construction work without paying anything for it; essentially, an unjust enrichment argument.  Coco also relied on s. 69 of the Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c. L-7, which creates a statutory lien in favour of someone who has made a lasting improvement to land in the belief that he owned it.
 
The Bank's case was based on s. 203(2)(a) of the Land Titles Act, RSA 2000, c. L-4.  Section 203 states that anyone dealing with a transfer, mortgage, or other interest in land is not bound by a trust or other interest in the land unless it is registered in the Land Titles system.  In addition, section 203(2)(b) provides that a party dealing with the land is unaffected by any notice of a trust or other unregistered interest in the land or by any rule of law or equity that might create an interest in the land.
 
Madam Justice Topolniski considered the public policy basis for the Torrens system, stating that the certificate of title "...is designed to meet a simple policy goal - to provide a clear, definitive mechanism to evaluate the status of land".  The objective of the system is to save purchasers and mortgagees the trouble and expense involved in going behind the register in order to investigate the validity of the owner's title.
 
The judge acknowledged that a Torrens system can impose hardships, noting that the legislation provides for compensation for those who suffer a loss out of an assurance fund.

Relying on decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario Superior Court, Justice Topolniski concluded that the legislation was a complete bar to the homebuilder's claim.  Under a Land Titles system, an unregistered interest has no effect on the registered title of a purchaser for value: United Trust Co. v. Dominion Stores Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 915.  Section 203 of the Act "represents an unequivocal abrogation of the doctrine of actual notice in Alberta such that, absent fraud, an unregistered interest cannot under any circumstances trump a registered interest.": Romspen Investment Corp. v. Edgeworth Properties, 2012 ONSC 4693.  The effect of s. 203 of the Land Titles Act is to extinguish Coco's claim, whether it arises out of common law, equity, or statute.

With respect to the argument under s. 69 of the Law of Property Act, the judge concluded that granting priority to an unregistered interest would defeat the intent of the legislature in adopting the Torrens system.  Section 69 applies where a person improves someone else's land "under the belief that the land was the person's own".  Although Coco had a contractual right to a transfer of title, it could not have held an honest belief that it owned the land at the time the developer went into receivership, so the claim under s. 69 failed.

Coco argued that the Bank could not take title to the improvements under the Nemo Dat rule (nemo dat quod non habet, or "no-one gives what he doesn't have").  Since the developer had not paid for the improvements, it didn't own them and couldn't mortgage them to the Bank.  The judge rejected this argument because fixtures permanently attached to the land become part of the land.

Finally, the court rejected the constructive trust argument, citing Supreme Court authority stating that a constructive trust cannot apply to the prejudice of a third party: Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217.

Although the outcome may seem like a windfall for the Bank, which did not finance the construction of the model home, on reflection it is fair.  The homebuilder was free to search title prior to starting work, and would have been aware that the lot was subject to a mortgage in favour of the Bank.  Coco could have insisted that the developer make arrangements to have the mortgage discharged before it built the home, and could have stopped work as soon as it became clear that the developer was not going to transfer title.

It is in the public interest that there should be a searchable registry available that provides an interested party with a complete picture of the state of title, so that people who buy, sell, and mortgage property know where they stand when they enter into a transaction.  As the judge determined, the legislature intended to provide such a registry when it created the Land Titles system, and giving registered interests priority over unregistered claims based on trust or statute is a necessary consequence.

Bank of Montreal v. 1323606 Alberta Ltd., 2013 ABQB 596

Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

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Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.

Tuesday 1 October 2013

When Is a Settlement Not a Settlement?

     The Alberta Court of Appeal

Settlement agreements often contemplate formal documentation that is to be prepared and executed later, most commonly a release "in a form satisfactory to counsel".  What happens if the form of the release proposed by one party's lawyer is not acceptable to counsel for the opposing party? That was the issue in Tessier v. City of Edmonton, a recent decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal.
 
The Settlement Discussions
 
This was an expropriation case.  During a break in the hearing before the Alberta Land Compensation Board, counsel for the property owners telephoned the lawyer for the City and offered to settle for $650,000, plus an additional amount of money that had been agreed previously.  Legal and expert fees were to be subject to a later negotiation.  Counsel for the City called back a few minutes later and, upon receiving confirmation that the owners would sign a release, accepted this proposal.
 
These terms, including the provision for a release, were confirmed later that day in an email from the City's lawyer to counsel for the owners.  On resumption of the hearing the following day, the lawyer for the owners advised the Board that the dispute had been settled, and asked that the case be adjourned subject to the execution of final documents and the payment of funds.  Two days later, however, the owners' lawyer told the solicitor for the City that his clients did not want to proceed with the settlement.  Counsel for the City took the position that a settlement had been concluded and sent opposing counsel a draft release.  In a letter the following day, the City's lawyer enclosed cheques for the settlement funds, to be held in trust pending execution and return of the release and the filing of a discontinuance with the Board.
 
Decision of the Board
 
The City applied to the Board for a determination as to whether or not there was a settlement.  When the lawyer for the owners was called as a witness, he testified that there was a settlement that had to be "papered".  The release he received from opposing counsel was typical of those he had previously negotiated with the City, except it had no confidentiality provision.  The Board ruled that there was a binding settlement, and the owners appealed to the Court of Appeal.
 
Decision on Appeal
 
The Court stated that the issue on appeal involved questions of contract law outside the Board's specialized expertise, so the standard of review was correctness.
 
The owners argued that the City's acceptance of the $650,000 offer was conditional because it contained additional terms that were set out in the release and the letter imposing trust conditions.  This was a counteroffer, and there was no deal as the counteroffer was never accepted.
 
The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments.  A settlement is a contract, and the contract is formed when the parties agree on the essential terms.  Once there is an agreement on essential terms, one party can tender a release on trust or escrow conditions without rescinding the agreement.  Although in some cases there will be a dispute over the terms of the release or the escrow conditions, that didn't happen in this case as the owners disavowed the settlement before the draft release was delivered.  In this situation, proffering a release or imposing trust conditions could not amount to a counteroffer.
 
In this case, it seems that the Board and the Court of Appeal were both influenced by the fact that the owners tried to back out of the agreement before the draft release was tendered, and that the objections to the release appeared to be an attempt to justify this after the fact.
 
Settled Law on Settlements
 
What if there is a genuine dispute over the terms of the release? These documents can be lengthy and complex, and are often the subject of much back-and-forth negotiation between counsel for the parties.  If counsel cannot reach an agreement about the terms of the release, is the settlement dead? Or can the court approve a release that the parties will be required to sign?
 
This issue has been the subject of previous litigation.  In Tessier v. Edmonton, the Court of Appeal referred to Fieguth v. Acklands Ltd., a 1989 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.  The principles are well-established in the case law:
 
(1)     The question of whether or not a case has been settled is to be resolved by the application of the rules of contract formation;
 
(2)     Once there is an agreement on essential terms, the settlement is a binding contract;
 
(3)     A settlement implies an obligation to furnish a release, and if an action is outstanding, a consent dismissal as well;
 
(4)     A proposal to discontinue an action, with nothing more, does not amount to an offer to settle the underlying claim, so a release is not implied and need not be provided;
 
(5)     Settlement includes an implied right to a simple release of the claim that is the subject of the litigation, but unusual or additional terms, such as indemnity provisions, are not implied and have to be specifically agreed;
 
(6)     Once the parties agree on terms of settlement a contract has been formed, and this stage must be distinguished from later actions directed towards the execution or implementation of the settlement contract, such as the payment of funds or the proffering of a release;
 
(7)     Once the essential terms are agreed, subsequent conduct relating to the payment of funds, imposition of escrow terms, or the exchange of concluding documents in draft form will not vitiate the settlement unless one party goes so far as to repudiate the settlement agreement by refusing to carry out its terms;
 
(8)     In order to amount to repudiation, the conduct must constitute an unequivocal refusal to perform the contract, the equivalent of frustration or rescission of the contract;
 
(9)     If counsel cannot agree on a release, either party can apply to the Court for an order enforcing the settlement, which would include an order approving the release;
 
(10)    If there is an actual repudiation, the opposing party has the option of accepting the repudiation, which voids the settlement.  The litigation would then proceed as if there never was a settlement agreement.
 
 
Contact Richard Hayles at Billington Barristers:
(403) 930-4106

Visit our website: http://billingtonbarristers.com

View my profile on LinkedIn: Richard Hayles on LinkedIn


Any legal information provided is general in nature and may not apply to particular situations. It does not constitute legal opinion or advice. Please consult your lawyer regarding your specific legal issue.